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THE PRIMARY policy objective of the Federal
Reserve System in 1971 was to continue progress
toward expansion of real output and employment
coupled with a slowing in inflation. The major policy
instrument used in pursuit of this objective was open
market operations, which are determined by the Fed-
eral Open Market Committee (FOMC ) .~
Expansionary policy actions taken in 1970 had laid
the foundation for economic recovery in 1971. The
money stock had increased at a 5.4 percent rate in
1970 compared to a 3.2 percent rate in 1969. Long-
and short-term interest rates had declined markedly
from peaks earlier in 1970. By the end of 1970, some
small improvements toward the reduction of inflation
could be noted, and further improvements in 1971
were anticipated. However, with unemployment at 6
percent and utilization of plant facilities at relatively
low levels, unemployed resources remained a primary
policy consideration.
Policy objectives of the Committee at the first three
meetings were stated as follows :2
to foster financial conditions conductive to the
resnmption of sustainable economic growth, while
encouraging an orderly reduction in the rate of
inflation and the attainment of reasonable equilib-
rium in the country’s balance of paysnents.
5Other policy instruments of the Federal Reserve System,
such as reserve requirements and Regulation Q ceiling rates,
were not altered in 1971, The discount rate was changed six
times, lowered three times in January and February, raised
in July, and then lowered two more times by the end of
1971. These changes, however, primarily represented at-
tempts to keep the discount rate in line, with prevailing
market rates.
t
Unless specifically footnoted, all quotes in this article conic
from the “Record of Policy Actions” of the Federal Open
Market Committee, published in the Federal Reserve
Bulletin,
The FOMC members were also concerned about
large outflows of short-term capital that occurred dur-
ing 1971. At the April meeting and continuing through
the July meeting, a new clause was added to the
policy consensus stating that the Committee desired
to moderate these outflows. The policy consensus was
further modified at the August meeting to take ac-
count of the President’s New Economic Program. A
clause was added stating the intention of the Com-
inittee to “foster financial conditions consistent with
the aims” of the new program.
In accordance with the objective of promoting eco-
nomic expansion without renewed inflation, the Com-
mittee desired throughout most of 1971 both relatively
low interest rates and moderate growth of monetary
aggregates. These intermediate objectives were to be
achieved by setting forth specified ranges for measures
of money market conditions — money market interest
rates and net borrowed or free reserves — to be
achieved by the Desk during the interval between
each Committee meeting.3
As the year progressed, conflicting views on the
relative isnportance that should be assigned to interest
rates and monetary aggregates became evident. For
example, at the May 11 FOMC meeting some
members expressed concern “that expansion in M1
[currency plus demand deposits held by the nonbank’
public] at the first-quarter pace for an extended pe-
riod would be inconsistent with an orderly reduction
in the rate of inflation.” Moderation of monetary
growth would have required that the Desk be in-
structed to follow a less expansionary open market
policy, which in the near term, most likely would
aFor a discussion of this type of operating strategy see page 13.
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have lead to higher interest rates. Other members
expressed the view that “sharp increases in long-term
rates at this juncture might have adverse conse-
quences for spending ...and might thus pose a
threat to the economic recovery under xvay.’ These
members were reluctant to accept a more restrictive
open market stance.
Later in the year an opposite type of conflict de-
veloped when the money stock had ceased to expand
and interest rates had fallen. At the Novesnber meet-
ing “[t]he view was expressed that it would be par-
ticularly unfortunate in this climate for the recent
weak performance of the monetary aggregates to per-
sist for long, since the lack of significant growth in the
aggregates could become an isnportant independent
source of uncertainty. At the same time, some meat-
bers cautioned against unduly aggressive action to
stimulate monetary expansion.”
An article in the Federal Reserve Bulletin discussed
the possibility that such conflicts could develop:
These desires may sometimes turn out to be in
conflict; fur example, monetary aggregates as a
group may he rising more rapidly than desirable
while credit cussditions may he tightening snore than
desirable. Meeting one desire by holding back on
the provisioss of reserves in order to restrain growth
in bank credit and money would tend, at least
tensporarily, to thwart the other desire by leading to
even more tightening of credit conditions. Under
such circs,smstances, the Account Manager would
have to adjust his operations — tlses’ebv affecting day-
to—day money market conditions — in line with the
sense of priority among operating objectives given
by the FOMC.”
Throughout most of 1971, the Conmsnittce sought to
resolve this problem by cautiously adjusting snarket
conditions in seeking desired rates of monetary
expansion.
This article is primarily concerned with an analysis
of problems inherent in the operating strategy used
by the FOMC. The following definitions are used:
policy refers to the ultisnate objectives of FOMC
actions — total spending, output, emplovsnent. prices,
and the balance of payments; intermediate objectives
are desired movements in monetary aggregates and
interest rates to achieve the Committee’s ultimate
objectives; operating strategy refers to the specific
instructions given to the Desk as a sneans of achieving
desired movements in the intersnediate objectives.
The suppiement at the end of this article reviews
in greater detail the FOMC decisions in 1.971 as pre-
“Monetary Aggregates and Money Market Conditions in Open
Market Policy,” Federal Reserve Bulletin (February 1971),
p. 95.
sented in the “Record of Policy Actions,.” The mnember-
ship, procedures, and tenns used in connection with
the FOMC are discussed in the section entitled “The
Federal Open Market Committee in 1971” on page 13.
Implementing Policy With a
Money Market Conditions Strategy
The operating strategy of the Desk remained essen-
tiall)’ the same during 1971 as it had been in past
years. This sts’ategy, as described by Governor Andrew
F. Brimmer, was as follows:
They [the views of time menshers of the FOMC]
svouid also probably contain enough common dc—
messts relating to operating tactics to add up to a
pattern of belsayior which call be described as the
pursuit of a money market strategy in the conduct
of open market operations. Basic to this strategy is
the focus osl a configuration of morley snarket con—
ditions as operating guides for the Manager of the
SOMA [System Open Market Account]. While the
specific money market vanables have varied over
tune, they have typically included: (1) member
bank borrowings frosn the Federal Reserve Banks;
2) net free reserves; (3) the Federal funds rate;
and (4) time 3—month Treasury bill rate. These
money market variables are to be used by the Man-
ager to influence the behavior of a variety of inter-
mediate financial variables, which may’ include: (1)
the general structure of nominal interest rates; (2)
nsonetarv or credit aggregates (such as tile money
supply — broadly or narrowly defined, member bank
credit, deposits (If nonbank financial institutions, Or
similar qisantitative measures) ; and (.3) the generai
environment of credmt and banking market as re—
flected irs expectations, and the demand for and
supply of total credit in tile economy.
in emther words. through reserve absorption or sup—
plying operations isl tile ITsarket, tile Manager of the
SOMA attempts to bring about or maintain a de-
sirable set of naonev market conditions (e.g., raising
or lowering time 3—month Treasury bill yield or rates
on Federal ftnscls l with tile expectation that the
iutenlsediate msloetary variallles (e.g., bank credit
or money supply) will contract or expand at a rate
consistent with the requirements of econosnie stabili-
zation. For each F()MC meeting, tile staff prepares
an musalvsis of time reiationshitls likely to prevasi
among snossev market (‘onditions, interest rates, and
the mossciary aggregates over a coming period, isl—
dic.ating lhe growth rates in vanslus aggregates cx—
peeteci to he associated with each of several described
kinds of money market conditions.I
The operating clause of the directive during 1971
placed varying emphasis on the intermediate objec-
lAndrew F. Brimnler, ~‘~1~he Political Econosny of Money:
Evolotioss and lsnpaet of Monetarisni in the Federal Reserve
System” (Paper delivered at the Eightv—fos.srth Annssal Meet-
ing of the Aslsericass Economic Association, New Orleans,
Louisiana, December 27, 1971), pp. 15-16, 17.
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Eves of monetary aggregates and interest rates. The
policy directive issued at the first FOMC meeting in
1971 placed equal emphasis on credit market condi-
tions and snonetary aggregates.
To implement this policy, the Cosnmittee seeks to
promote accommodative conditions in credit markets
and moderate expansion irs monetary and credit
aggregates. System open market operations until the
next meeting of the Committee shall be conducted
with a ‘view to maintaining bank reserves and money
snas’ket conditions consistent with those objectives,
taking account of the forthcoming Treasury financing.
At the next three meetings, however, wording of
the directive was changed to place primary emphasis
on money market conditions and long-term interest
rates. For example, the February directive read:
Systesn open market operations until the next
meeting of the Committee shall be conducted with a
view to snaintaining prevailing money market con-
ditions while accomsnodating additional downward
movements in long-term rates.
Aggregates were relegated to the proviso clause
which specified that money market conditions were to
“promptly be eased somewhat further if it appears
that the monetary aggregates are falling short of the
growth path desired.” At the March and April meet-
ings, the proviso clause was modified to specify that
money market conditions should be modified if it
appeared that the monetary and credit aggregates
were deviating significantly frosn the growth paths
expected.
At the May 11 meeting the language of the direc-
tive was shifted to place greater emphasis on growth of
monetary and credit aggregates. Other objectives were
also specified, including “taking account of the current
Treasury financing, developments in capital snarkets,
and uncertainties in foreign exchange markets.”
The May directive specified that, initially, money
smsarket conditions should be maintained at those cur-
rently prevailing. Thereafter, money market condi-
tions were to be consistent with the objectives stated,
including moderating growth in snonetary and credit
aggregates. At the remaining FOMC sneetings in 1971,
the language of the directives gave primary emphasis
to monetary and credit aggregates. In addition, at
several meetings it was noted that capital market de-
velopnlents should he taken into account as well as
Treasury financings.
Growth rates of nionetary aggregates were not the
sole concern of the FOMC in 1971. However, at
every meeting the aggregates were discussed and at
snost meetings some members of the FOMC expressed
concern about their current and projected growth
rates. At each meeting growth rates of the aggregates
expected to be consistent with given snoney market
conditions were presented to the Committee. To the
extent that the Committee was interested in growth of
the aggregates, these projections probably influenced
the decisions of the FOMC members on money market
conditions the Desk was instructed to maintain.
Projecting the Growth of Money
During the first half of 1971 projected growth rates
for money that were expected to result from the
adopted set of money market conditions were substan-
tially below actual growth rates of money. On the
other hand, during the second half of the year, projec-
tions, again based on the assumption of adopted
money market conditions, were substantially above
actual growth rates.
At the first three meetings of 1971 money was ex-
pected to grow at an annual rate of about 6 to 7.5 per-
cent during the first quarter. The actual rate was 9.4
percent.° In the second quarter, estimates for the
growth of money consistent with the adopted money
market strategy ranged from about & to 9 percent at
the April and May meetings. At the May meeting it
was expected that “a sharp firming of money market
conditions would be required to slow expansion in M1
sufficiently during the rest of the second quarter to
achieve a substantial moderation of growth over the
quarter as a whole.” Table I shows that there was
some firming of money market conditions in May and
June; however, money grew at an 11 percent rate over
the second quarter.
The FOMC desired a more rapid growth in money
over the first part of 1971 than had occurred in the
fourth quarter of 1970. However, the rapid increase
in money that occurred over the first half of the year
clearly exceeded that expected to accompany the
money market conditions adopted by the Committee.
As early as the March 9 meeting, when a7percent
snonetary growth rate was projected for the first quar-
ter, the FOMC decided that:
money market rates were to be increased some-
what if the aggregates were rising considerably
faster than expected. .
“Following tise procedure used by the staff analysis for the
FOMC, quartes’ly growth rates are ealcsslated on the basis of
the daily-average level in the last month of the quarter reia-
tiye to tisat in the last month of the preceding quarter.
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At the April 6 meeting, when the first quarter
growth rate of money was estimated at & percent, the
FOMC stated:
it would like to see more moderate expansion
in the monetary aggregates in the second quarter
than had occurred in the first.
From the March 9 meeting to the August 24 meet-
ing, the Policy Record stated, in general, that open
market operations were initially aimed at maintaining
prevailing money market conditions, and then aimed
at achieving slightly or somewhat firmer money market
conditions as incoming data indicated the monetary
aggregates were expanding significantly faster than
expected.
During this period only gradual tightening of
money snarket conditions was permitted. For example,
in the period prior to the April 6 meeting:
efforts were made during the period to counter
repetitive tendencies toward undue finnness that
arose frosn market factors affecting reserves.
Also in the period immediately following tlse May 11
itseeting:
System open market operations had been directed
at maintaining prevailing money market conditions
in light of the Treasury financing then in process
and the sensitive state of conditions in capital
mnrkets.
In late June the growth of money for the third
quarter, with prevailing snoney market conditions, was
projected to be at a slightly slower rate than the sec-
ond quarter, and at about 9 percent with some firming
in money market conditions. At the July 27 meeting
projections were revised downward slightly to about
an & to 9 percent rate with some further firming of
money market conditions. The actual annual growth
rate for money over the third quarter was 3.8 percent.
At the September 21 meeting it was projected that
if prevailing money market conditions were main-
tained, growth in M, would be slower in the fourth
quarter than in the third quarter. At the October
meeting growth of M5 was projected to be about the
same rate in the fourth quarter as the third quarter,
assuming prevailing money market conditions. Money
market conditions in fact eased, yet the actual growth
rate for the fourth quarter was 1.1 percent.
Inconsistency of Money Market Conditions
and Desired Growth of Money
Although snoney market conditions approved at
each meeting of the FOMC as operating instructions
for the Desk may have been consistent with the mem-
bers’ intermediate objectives for market interest rates,
these conditions were not consistent with the growth
rates of money expected by the members. The growth
trend of money accelerated at an exfremely rapid rate
over the first seven months of 1971 and then deceler-
ated at an equally rapid rate in the latter part of the
year.
Periodically some members of the FOMC expressed
concern about the growth paths of the monetary ag-
gregates that were resulting from the money market
operating strategy. For example, Mr. Kimbrel dis-
sented at the April meeting because he “believed that
higher short-term interest rates would be desirable
mainly to hold growth in the monetary and credit ag-
gregates to a moderate pace in order to avoid a re-
kindling of inflationary expectations.” At the May
meeting “[t]he view was widely held among mem-
bers that expansion in M5 at the first-quarter pace for
an extended period would be inconsistent with an
orderly reduction in the rate of inflation.” At the De-
cember meeting “[cionsiderable concern was ex-
pressed about the persistent weakness of key mone-
tary aggregates despite the progressive easing of
money market conditions in recent months.”
In early 1971 the rapid acceleration was initially
viewed as representing a make-up for the slower than
desired growth rate in the fourth quarter of 1970, when
growth of money had slowed to a 3.8 percent rate.
However, over the last half of 1970 money had grown
at a 5.2 percent rate. Make-up for the fourth quarter
slowdown in monetary growth was very rapid; money
rose at a 9.4 percent rate in the first quarter and at
an 11 percent rate in the second quater. From June
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1970 to June 1971, money grew at a rapid 7.7 percent
rate.
In the third quarter of 1971, the early stage of the
deceleration of money was vicwcd as a welcome offset
to rapid growth over previous snonths of the year. At
first the FOMC was reluctant to push for a more
rapid growth of money. However, by the November
16 meeting, the FOMC clearly desired to reverse the
trend growth of money. The Cosnmittec desired:
sosnewhat greater growth in monetary and credit
aggregates over the months ahead, recognizing that
pursuit of that objective might require appreciably
easier money market conditions.
Until mid-Novesnber the Desk moved cautiously
within the money market directive to prevent rapid
deceleration of money. Beginning in September, the
Policy Record states that, in general, open market op-
erations were directed at a gradual easing of money
market conditions in light of the continuing tendency
of the snonctary aggregates to fall below expected
paths.
As shown in Table I, money market conditions
eased somewhat from Septesnber through December.
however, until after mid-November easing was rela-
tively gradual. The Federal funds rate, svhich aver-
aged 5.53 percent between the late Ju]y and late
August meetings, fell to only 5,09 percent, on average,
prior to the mid-November meeting. The money stock
did not respond to this cautious easing of money
market conditions. There was no growth, on average,
in snoney from mid-September to mid-December.
Factors Influencing Money Growth in 1971
In published explanations of the behavior of money
growth last year the Federal Open Market Committee
placed primary emphasis on factors that were asserted
to determine the demand for money. The following
quotes illustrate this view:
The rate of growth of both currency and privately
held demand deposits rose because of considerably
lower interest rates than earlier and the post-strike
rebound in economic activity [“Financial Develop-
ments in the First Quarter of 1971,” Federal Reserve
Bulletin (May 1971), p. 368].
And the monetary aggregates expanded at rapid
rates in the first quarter, with growth in M, (cur-
rency and private demand deposits) reflecting in-
creased transactions demands and tlse lagged effects
of previosss declines in interest rates. [Monetary
Policy arid the U.S. Economy in 1971: A Prelude
to the Annual Report, Board of Governors, p. 6].
The monetary aggregates continued to expand at
a strong pace in the second quarter of 1971. .. .Psi-
manly, however, the increase reflected the impact
on transaction demands for money of the sisbstantial
expasssion in expersditores that occurred in both
the first and second quarters of the year and the
lagged response of consusner densands for money to
the sharp earlier decline of market interest rates
[“Finasscial Developments in tlse Second Quarter of
1971,” Federal Reserve Bulletin (August 1971), p.
641].
Stall analysis suggested that the new economic
program, along with other forces— including lagged
reactions to earlier increases in short-term interest
rates — should tend to produce lower rates of growth
in the snonetary aggregates over the rest of the year
[Federal Reserve Bulletin (December 1971), p. 994].
At the time of the previous meeting of the Coin—
mittee it had been expected that growth in M5 would slow from tlse average annual rate of 10
per ceut recorded us the first 7 months of the year,
in part in a lagged response to earlier increases in
short-term interest rates, and that M2 would con-
tinue to expand at about the moderate rate that
had emerged in July. For both measures, however,
actual growth rates in August were lower than had
been anticipated partly for reasons related to the
flows of funds into foreign eun~encies,
As at the previous meeting, staff analysis sug-
gested that the effects of the new economic program
on desrsands for money, together with lagged re-
actions to earlier increases in short—term interest
rates, should tessd to produce much lower average
rates of growth in the monetary aggregates over
the rest of 1971 thass had been recorded earlier in
the year [Federal Reserve Bulletin (January 1972),
pp. 36, 37].
It seems likely that the sharp slowing of M1 growth in August was in large part attribntable to
the heavy outflow of dollars into foreign exchange
markets. Weakness continued in September, how-
ever, after the outflow was severely cut back. This
was apparently related to a reduction in demands
for money balances in response to greater confi-
dence and expectation of declining interest rates
resulting from the President’s new economic program
[“Financial Developments in the Third Quarter of
1971,” Federal Reserve Bulletin (November 1971),
pp. 872-873].
Staff~asralysissuggested that the effects of two
factors that had been tending irs recent months to
hold down demands for money — moderation of in—
flationarv expectations as a result of the new eco-
nomic program, and lagged reactions to the high
short-term interest rates of late spring and early
summer — prcshahly had about run their course. Ac-
cording to the analysis, if money market conditions
were similar to those prevailing or slightly easier,
M1, would begin to grow again in December and
would expand faster oxen the first quarter — at a
pace more nearly in line than recently with growing
transactions demands [Federal Reserve Bulletin
(February 1972), p. 139].
The rate of expansion in the narrowly defined
money stock (M3), which had declined substan-
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tially in the third quarter from the very rapid pace
established earlier in the year, slowed further to a
modest I per cent annual rate 0f growth, as public
demands for cash balances remained small in the
wake of the vesy large build-up in liquidity over
the first half of the year.
M, may not have responded snore sensitively
to factors that generally prosnote growth in this ag-
gregate, in part because time public decided to reduce
precautionary balances hisilt up earlier in the year
when there was greater concern about the eco-
nomic outlook, hi addition, some money—holders mnay
have been gradually shifting out of cash balances
into interest-bearing assets in the belief that the
wage-price control program would meet with success
amsd that interest rates would he lower in the future.
Finally, experieisce indicates that it takes time for
the public to adjust its cash balances upward in
response to lower short—term interest rates [“Finan-
cial Dex’ekspmessts in the Fourth Quarter of 1971,”
Federal Reserve Bulletin (February 1972) pp. R5-96,
98].
A Supply and Demand Analysis
These propositions can be examined with de-
mand and supply analysis. In Figures I-IV, the de-
mand curve for money balances is represented by
“D”, and the supply curve for money balances by
“5”. Quantities of money (NI) demanded and sup-
plied are expressed as dependent upon the current
interest rate (i). Let us assume that the demand for
money depends negatively on past values of the in-
terest rate and positively upon growth of income as
the previous quotes suggest. These factors operate to
shift D. The money supply also depends on the snone-
tary base. An increase in the base shffts S to the right
and a decrease in the base shifts S to the left.
A couple of expositional points should be csnpha-
sized at this point. The money stock, quantity of
money balances demanded and quantity of money
balances supplied, is measured along the horizontal
axis in Figures I-TV. The money supply and money
demand refer to the curves labeled S and D. A change
in the money supply would appear as a shift in the
curve labeled S. The money stock is determined by
the interaction of money supply and money demand.
Values of the current interest rate are measured on
the vertical axis of the graphsJ As the interest rate
rises the quantity of money supplied rises, even though
the monetary base is unchanged; for example, banks
reduce their excess reserves. In Figures I-TV this would
appear as a movement along S. As the interest rate
rises the quantity of money balances demanded de-
creases and this appeams as a movement along D.
7This analysis is based on conventional liquidity prcference
thcory, Another analysis would include credit markct
conditions.
Lagged values of the interest rate enter as shift para-
meters in the demand for snoney function.
In Figures I-TV the size of the change in the money
stock resulting from a shift in the demand for money
depends upon the slopes of D and S. If these cum-ves
have relatively steep slopes, as shown in the illustra-
tions, then a shift in either Do rS will have less of
an effect on the money stock and relatively more of
an effect on the interest rate than if the curves are
drawn with flatter slopes. Most esnpirical estimates
indicate that the percent response of both the supply
and demand for money balances to a percent change
in short-term interest rates is small. This implies a
relatively steep slope for each curve. Therefore, this
analysis incorporates these empirical results.
Demand Factors — Over the first half of 1971, be-
cause interest rates had declined in the second half of
1970 and growth of income accelerated in the first
half of 1971, the above analysis would suggest that
the demand for money (D) shifted to the right
from D to D’ as shown in Figure I. If the supply curve
(5) is unchanged (that is, no change in the base),
then the interest rate rises to V from i and the money
stock expands to M’ from M,
Interest rates rose in the first half of 1971 and
growth of income slowed somewhat in the second half
of the year. Tlus would imply, following the conjec-
tured relationship between lagged interest rates, in-
come and the demand for money given in the above
quotes, that the demand for money was shifting to
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in Figure H. As the demand for money falls from D
to D’, and if the money supply function (5) remains
unchanged, then the interest rate declines from i to i’
and the money stock declines from M to M’.
If the supply of money (5) is unchanged (that is,
no change in the monetary base), then growth of the
money stock that occurred was completely demand
determined, as postulated in the above quotes. How-
ever, as long as the response of the money supply to
changes in the base is not zero, then Federal Reserve
open market operations which alter the growth of the
base influence the supply of money, and hence, the
snoney stock outstanding.
Supply Factors — Consequently, for a more complete
analysis of money growth during 1971, behavior of
the monetarybase must also be considered. Growth of
the base accelerated markedly during the first half of
1971, then decelerated sharply in the second half of
the year. Therefore, the explanations of Figures I and
II must be broadened to include shifts in S.
Figure III illustrates the conditions for the first half
of 1971 taking the supply factors into account. From
December 1970 to July 1971 the monetary base grew
at a 9.4 percent annual rate. As the base grew rap-
idly, the money supply function (5) was substantially
shifted to the right to 5’. Taking supply effects into
account, the interest rate rises only to i”, but the
money stock expands to NI” instead of’ only to M’.
Figure IV illustrates the case for the latter part of
1971. From July to December the monetary base grew
at only a 3.6 percent rate, and from September to
December at only a 2.3 percent rate. The supply
curve shifted only slightly to the right, as compared
to the first half of the year, and the mnoney stock re-
mained at NI (no change) while market interest rates
fell.8
8The money stock averaged $228 billion in August 1971 and
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Effect of Operating to Offset Changes In
Interest Rates
Figure V may be used to illustrate problems that
can arise in controlling the growth of money when
the Desk is instructed to use open market operations
to maintain a narrow range for short-tersn interest
rates or persnit only gradual changes in interest rates.
Suppose that there is an increase in the mnoney de-
mand curve from D to D’, as illustrated in Figure V,
and the Desk has been instructed to prevent the
interest rate from rising above i”. If no offsetting action
is taken the interest rate will rise to i’, above the
upper bound of the Desk’s instructions. To keep the
interest rate below i” the Desk would buy securities,
which would increase the growth of the base and
shift S to 5’ as shown in Figure V. The interest rate
temporarily rises only to i”, but as shown in Figure V,
money rises to M” rather than M’. Assuming the growth
of income is positively related to the growth of snoney,
then the growth of income accelerates, the demands
for money and credit rise, and the Desk must again
increase the grosvth of the base to prevent a further
rise in interest rates. By reversing this analysis, it
can be seen that if market rates are falling and the
Desk is given instructions to operate within too nar-
row a range on the interest rate then the opposite
situation could arise.
Therefore, FOMC instructions to the Desk to pre-
vent desnand induced changes in market interest
rates result in asnplifying the fluctuations in the rate
of growth of the money stock. When in the face of
demand induced changes in interest rates the FOMC
gives the Desk instructions to maintain interest rates
within a narrow hand, the gro\\’th of the money stock
can be considered demand determined. However,
“demand determined” in this case has quite a different
meaning from that in Figures I and II where no
change occurred in the money supply function, that is,
no change in the monetary base, The money stock
is demand determined in the case where the base
changes because the Desk is instructed to resist de-
snand induced changes in mnarket interest rates which
are not desired by the FOMC. In this circumstance
the FOMC faces the decision of whether to control the
growth of money or temporarily offset demand in-
duced changes in interest rates, If the decision is made
to control market interest rates, then the growth of
money may deviate significantly from the expected
growth rate.
The relative weights attached by mesnbers of the
Commnittee to money stock growth and interest rates
were given careful consideration in the decisions of the
FOMC, For examnple, at the May 11 and June 29
meetings the possible short-run interest rate effects of
open market operations necessary to substantially slow
the growth of money influenced the decisions of the
Committee.
May ii Meeting
In the discussion Committee members expressed
concern both about the recent high rates of growth
in the monetary aggregates and about the marked
increases that had occurred in long-term interest
rates, The view was widely held among members
that expansion in M, at the first-quarter pace for an
extended period would be inconsistent with an or-
derly reduction in the rate of inflation. Also widely
held, however, was the view that sharp increases in
long-term rates at this juncture nmight have adverse
consequemsces for spending, particularly in the resi-
dential constructiors and State and local government
sectors, and might thus pose a threat to the economic
recovery under way.
Although there were some rather snarked differ-
ences in the stress that individual members placed
on these two types of considerations, the Committee
agreed that it would not be desirable at present
either to revert to the money market conditions that
had prevailed until the end of April or to seek the
amos nt of firming tlsat evidently would he required
to achieve a substantial slowing of growth in the
aggregates over to tise second quarter.
June 29 Meeting
In the Comsrsittee’s discussion considerable concern
~vas expressed ahorst the rapid grosvth in the mone-
tary aggregates, particularly in light of the persist-
ence of inflationary pressures and expectations. At
the same tinne, concern was expressed about the recent
upward pressures on interest rates, in view of the
dependence of the current economic recovery on
continued expansion in such interest—sensitive sectors
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January 12 In light af the foregoing developments, it is the
policy of the Federal Open Market Commitlee to
fosler financial conditions conducive to the re-
sumption of sustainable economic growth, while
encouraging an orderly reduction in the rote of
inflation and the attainment of reasonable
equilibrium in the country’s balance of payments.
Dissents:
Mr. Francis
February 9N a Change
Dissents:
March 9 No Change
Dissents:
Nan e
In light of the foregoing developments, it is the
policy of the Federal Open Market Committee to
foster financial conditions conducive to the
resumption of sustainable economic growth,
while encouraging an orderly reduction in the
rate of inflation, moderation of short-term capi-
tal outflows, and attainment af reasonable





To implement this policy, the Committee seeks to pro-
mote accommodative conditions in credit markets and
moderate expansion in monetary and credit aggregates.
System open market operations until the next meeting of
the Committee shall be conducted with a view to main-
taining bank reserves and money market conditions con-
sistent with those objectives, taking account of the forth-
coming Treasury financing.
-.-System open market operations until the next meet-
ing of the Committee shalt be conducted with a view to
maintaining prevailing money market conditions while
accommodating additional downward movements in long-
term rates;
-.-System open market operations until the next meet-
ing of the Committee shall be conducted with a view to
maintaining prevailing money market conditions while
accommodating any downward movements in long-term
rates;
-. -while taking account of the Treasury financing the
terms of which ore to be announced late in the month,
System open market operations until the next meeting of
the Committee shall be conducted with a view to attaining
temporarily some minor firming in money market condi-
tions, while continuing to meet same part of reserve needs
through purchases of coupon issues in the interest af
promoting accommodative conditions in long-term credit
markets;
-.-the Committee seeks to moderate growth in monetary
and credit aggregates over the months ahead, taking
account of the current Treasury financing, developments in
capital markets, and uncertainties in foreign exchange
markets. System open market operations until the next
meeting of the Committee shall be aimed initially at main-
taining currently prevailing money market conditions, and
thereafter conducted with a view to maintaining bank
reserves and money market conditions consistent with the
above-cited objectives.
provided that money market conditions shall promptly
be eased somewhat further if it appears that the mone-
tary aggregates ore falling short of the growth path
desired.
provided that money market conditions shalt be modi-
fied if it appears that the monetary and credit aggre-
gates are deviating significantly from the growth paths
expected.
provided that money market conditions shall be modi-
fied if it appears that the monetary and credit aggre-
gates are deviating significantly from the growth paths
desired.
Mr. Francis
Proviso Clause of Directive
no proviso clause
April 6





No Change ...the Committee seeks to moderate growth in monetary
Dissents: aggregates over the months ahead, taking account of
None developments in capital markets. System open market
operations until the next meeting of the Committee shalt
be conducted with a view to achieving bank reserve and




June 29 No Change
Dissents,
None
In light of the foregoing developments, it is
the policy of the Federal Open Market Com-
mittee to foster financial conditions conducive to
sustainable economic growth, while encouraging
an orderly reduction in the rate of inflation,
moderation of short-term capital outfiaws, and
attainment of reasonable equilibrium in the
country’s balance of payments.
Dissents:
None
August 24 In light of the foregoing developments, it is
the policy of the Federal Open Market Com-
mittee to foster financial conditions consistent
with the aims of the new governmental program,
including sustainable real econamic growth and
increased employment, abatement of inflationary
pressures, and attainment of reasonable equili-
brium in the country’s balance of payments.
Dissents,
-.- the Committee seeks to achieve more moderate
growth in monetary aggregates over the months ahead,
taking account of developments in capital markets. System
open market operations until the next meeting of the
Committee shall be conducted with a view to achieving
bank reserve and money market conditions consistent with
those objectives.
-.-taking account of the current Treasury financing and
of developments in capital markets, the Committee seeks
to achieve more moderate growth in monetary aggregates
over the months ahead. System open market operations
until the next meeting of the Committee shall be conducted
with a view to achieving bank reserve and money market
conditions consistent with those abjectives.
-.-the Committee seeks to achieve more moderate
growth in monetary and credit aggregates over the months
ahead. System open market operations until the next
meeting of the Committee shall be conducted with a view
to achieving bank reserve and money market conditions






September 21 No Change .. -the Committee seeks to achieve moderate growth in no proviso clause
Dissents, monetary and credit aggregates, taking account of devetop-
None ments in capital markets. System open market operations
until the next meeting of the Committee shall be conducted
with a view to achieving bank reserve and money market
conditions consistent with that objective.
October 19 No Change ..-the Committee seeks to achieve moderate growth no proviso clause
Dissents, in monetary and credit aggregates over the months ahead.
None System open market operations until the next meetng of
the Committee shall be conducted with a view to achieving
bank reserve and money market conditions consistent with
that objective, taking account of the forthcoming Treasury
financing.
November 16 No Change .. -the Committee seeks to promote somewhat greater no proviso clause
Dissents, growth in monetary and credit aggregates over the months
Nane ahead. System open market operations until the next
meeting of the Committee shall be conducted with a view
to achieving bank reserve and money market conditions
consistent with that objective.
December 14 No Change -.-the Committee seeks to promote the degree of ease
Dissents: in bank reserve and money market conditions essential to
None greater growth in monetary aggregates over the months
ahead, while takng account of international developments.’
SOIJR( 11 Reeosd of Polsey Aetsons csf the Fcdes as Open ‘-,ub.,s quesst to the Decemiser meetsng on Decenshc : ‘0 10
Market Committee, publishesi in the Fedesal Re- Cssnnmittee members voted unanimously to amend the ecu-
ses’ve Btsllefve nssmsc solsey directive by adding the clas.sse hile taking
,seeount of inte,nationat developments.’
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While the members agreed that an unduly sharp
firming of money market conditions should be
avoided because of the risk of undesired repercus-
sions on market interest rates, the Committee de-
cided that open market operations in the coming
period should be directed at achieving more mod-
erate growth in monetary aggregates over the months
ahead. As at the preceding meeting, it was agreed
that account should he taken of developments in
capital markets in the conduct of operations.
Every open market operation, regardless of its pur-
pose, affects the base. Open market operations aimed
at offsetting market detennined movements in inter-
est rates result in accelerations or decelerations of the
growth of the base and hence, shifts in the money
supply function. If greater short-run variations in in-
terest rates were permitted, the FOMC would be
better able to control the growth trend of money.
Money, Base, and Money Market Conditions
Movements in the base paralleled movements in
the money stock in 1971. as shown in Table II and the
accompanying chart. This close relationship between
growth of the monetary base and money is not unique
to this period. Table II also presents the pattern of
movements in the base and money over the recent
periods of sharp accelerations and decelerations.
Federal Reserve actions, primarily open market op-
erations, dominate the growth pattern of the mone-
tary base.9 Over any period of time, there will be a
set of money market conditions, a growth rate of base,
and a growth rate of money consistent with a given
course of open market actions, However, open market
operations that achieve a set of money market condi-
tions desired by the Committee may not he consistent
with a growth of the base necessary to achieve the
growth rate of money also desired by the Committee.
As shown in Table I, money market conditions
firmed in the period March through July. However,
as shown in Table II, the growth rate of the base ac-
celerated from 8.4 percent in March to 10 percent in
May and then remained at about a 9 percent rate
through July. Such a growth path for the base clearly
did not imply a much slower growth of money. Over
the second half of the year money market conditions
eased markedly, but the base decelerated dras-
tically. The growth path of money paralleled the
growth path of the monetary base, not the pattern of
money market conditions.
The situation where the growth pattern of money
deviated from that expected from specified money
market conditions is not a situation peculiar to 1971.
This same pattern can be traced in the Policy Record
of the FOMC in prior years.‘°
‘Other Federal Reserve actions that influence the monetary
base include Federal Reserve lending to snembr banks and
changes in member hank reserve reqtsirensents. tm0See Reprints 22, 28, 39, 57, and 68 for annual reviews of
monetary actions by the FOMC for the years 1966-70,
available on request from this Bank. See also Brimnier, “The
Political Economy of Money,” pp. 48-53, for a discussion of
the problems encountered in 1966.
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- E e actions are opposite from their initial effect For cx-
g ‘ c o - ample suppose that market rat are moving up~~ rd
and the FOMC decides to resist such a trend, The When implementing monetary policy a careful di -
Desk may bc in tructed to maintain prevailing money
tinction has to be made between the short run cffect
market conditions in other words usc open market
of a change in the base and the longer-mn effects of
such actions. The short iun effect of accelerating the operations to re ist a further use in market ratcs. To
growth of the base i to lower market interest rates do so, the Desk probably would have to accelerate its
while a deceleration of the ba e puts upwaid pressure purchase of securities, and thus growth of the base
on maiket rates and results in firming of other money would accelerate. The initial effect nould be to slow
mark t conditions however longer-run effects of such or to lower market interest rates.
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This acceleration of the base leads to an accelera-
tion in the growth of money, and over time total
spending rises more rapidly. An increased demand for
credit develops, and thus additional upward pressures
on market interest rates follow. “Maintaining existing
money market conditions,” or even permitting only
“some moderate firming in money market conditions”
may require a further acceleration in the base. This
process creates severe problems when the FOMC at-
tempts to control the growth of money by using a
money market strategy.
If money market conditions are firmed enough to
actually slow the growth of the base, then the growth
of money slows. However, if the slowdown of money
is maintained, then longer-run effects of this policy on
income and the demand for credit lead to falling mar-
ket rates and easier money market conditions. As rates
fall the FONTC may reason that its open market opera-
tions have caused the easing in the money market and
that the decline in market interest rates indicates that
open market operations are exerting a more expan-
sionary (or less restrictive) effect on their policy
objectives. The FONTC may therefore be reluctant to
increase its purchases of securities to halt a rapid de-
celeration of the base. Again, from a money market
operating strategy, it appears the Desk is attempting
to achieve a reversal in the growth trend of money.
However, from an analysis that emphasizes growth of
the base as the primary determinant of the growth of
money, the money market operating strategy again
spells considerable problems for money control.”
IiThese results are implied i,y considerable theoretical and
empirical research. For example, in a study of several large
econometric models Professor Joseph B. Zeeher fouod the
following (where Ba. denotes the net source base or non—
borrowed base)
(1) Although the adjustment patterns differ among
the models, all of the models imply that in the second
and later quarters after the change in Ba the responses
of both the short—tern, interest rate and the long—tern,
interest rate decay rapidly.
2 ) Using Ba to control the term structure of in-
terest rates is effective only in the quarter of the policy
action. By the second quarter most of the effect of the
policy action disappears and may actually be reversed
if income is especially responsive to changes in B’’.
3 ) A constant interest rate policy has the following
characteristics according to these models ( a ) control of
demand deposits is forfeited in the quarter in which
the policy is instituted; (b) control of time deposits is
forfeited after the first quarter; and (e) the sharp re-
vet-sal of the response to B’’ after the first quarter, and
the resulting shift in the relative influence on the short—
tenn interest rate of the initial changes in B’’ and in-
come, make the conduct of an interest rate policy in
succeeding quarters increasingly complicated.
See Joseph B. Zeeher, “An Evaluation of Four Econometric
Models of the Financial Sector,” Dissertation Series Number
1 in Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Economic Papers
(January 1970). The models studied were two versions of a
Conclusions
To attain its policy objectives in 1971 the FOMC
sought to use open market operations to achieve mod-
erate growth rates for the monetary aggregates and
moderately declining interest rates. However, if one
looks at the pattern of interest rates or the growth of
money over 1.971 both these series resemble a roller
coaster. Market rates fell early in the year, reversed
their course in February and March, then rose rapidly
until early August when they began a rapid decline
that carried into 1972. The growth of the money stock
accelerated at extremely rapid rates over the first half
of the year then decelerated at very rapid rates over
the sc’eond half of 1971.
The Committee’s intermediate objectives for interest
rates and growth of the monetary aggregates were
often in conflict in 1971. One conclusion of this article
is that the operating strategy based on allowing only
snmall changes in money market conditions in seeking
to avoid possible undesired movements in long-term
rates resulted in sharper accelerations and decelera-
tions in the growth of money in 1971 than desired by
the FOMC. The problems of tryingto implement mon-
etary policy with money market conditions as the pri-
mary target of open market operations had been
forcefully brought to the Committee’s attention by the
Maisel Committee Report completed in early March
1970,12 The report was not adopted formally by the
FOMC, nor has it been published. However, the gen-
eral content of the Maisel Report may be obtained
from a speech by Covernor Brimmer:
In general, the issue the Maisel Committee focused
on is the one already identified: if money market
conditions are the primary target of open market
operations, the FOMC has no clear and definitive
way 0f giving instructions to the Manager of the
MARCH 1972
model by Ronald L. Teigen, the Brookings model financial
section, and the FRB-MIT model group. Results similar to
the first item cited above were also obtained using the
Ancio-Goldfeld model in Zeeher, “Implications of Four Eco—
nometrie Models for the Indicator Issue,” American Eco-
I’omic Review (May 1970), pp. 47-54. especially Table 3,
p. 50. Also se’e William Ii. Gibson, “The Lag in the Effect
of Monetary Policy o,m Incomne and Interest Rates,” Quar-
terly Journalof Economics (May 1970), pp. 288-300; William
P. ‘i’ohe amid Denis S. Kam’nosky, ‘‘Interest Bates amid Price
level Changes, 1952—69,” tIns Rccicmv (December 1969),
pp. 18-38: and Albert F. Burger, “The Implementation
l’roblen, of Monetary Policy,” this Rerierv (March 1971 ),
pp. 20-30.
2The Maisel Committee Was a Subcommittee appointed by
Chairman Martin in the Spring of 1969 for time purpose of
explom’ing “leans iif improvimig open market operations. The
Commmiittee “as under the leadership of Governor Shennan
Maisel and also included Presidents Frank Morris (Boston),
and Eliot Swan (Sari Francisco). Papers prepared for the
Maiscl Committee are available in Open Market Policie.s and
Operating Procedures — Staff Stodies, Board of Governors
d)f the Federal Reserve System. 1971.
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SOMA [System Open Market Account]. If he
achieved specified goals in terms of interest rates
anrl other money mmaarket conditions, lie had no sure
way of reaching the Comniiteee’s objectives with
respect to bank credit amid the mdmmley supply. The
reverse is also true. Thus, given this conflict, the
need for basic reform of the FOMC’s approach to
monetary mnanagement was indicated.m1
Past experience with a money market operating
strategy’ has not led to stable interest rates and has
frequently resulted in a discrepancy between actual
and desired growth rates of money. Prolonged rapid
increases and decreases of the money stock that ac-
companmed this strategy, through their effects on total
spending, price expectations and consequently the de-
mnand for credit, have beemm a major factor in the
marked fluctuations in market rates during the past six
years. Also, sharp accelerations and decelerations of
the monetary base which have been necessary at times
to offset wide swings in time gro~vthof money have in-
duced short-run instability into the money market.
If the growth of the money stock in 1971 was com-
pletely demand determined (no shift in the money
‘
m
Brhnmer, “The Political Economy of Money,” pp. 59-60.
supply), then this would imply that very substantial
shifts occurred in money demand in 1971. Although
the evidence is not conclusive on the stability of the
demand for money, there is vemy little evidence that
suggests it is subject to very frequent and erratic
shifts.14
During 1971 the FOMC, on balance. resolved the
conflict between their desired path for interest rates
and their desired growth paths for monetary aggre-
gates by cautiously adjusting money market conditions
and hence accepting greater accelerations and de-
eelerations in money than they initially desired. The
resulting open market operating strategy led to a rapid
growth of the monetary base in the first half of 1971
and a rapid deceleration in the growth of the base in
the latter part of 1971. Although changes in the de-
mand for nmoney may have exerted some direct influ-
ence on growth of the money stock, changes in the
supply of money induced by these marked changes in
the growth of the monetary base were the dominant
influence on the gro\vth of money in 1971.
“See David E. V.’. Laidler, The Demand for Money: Theories
and Evidence (Scranton: International Textbook Co., 1969),
pp. 105-106.
SUPPLEMENT
Federal Open Market Committee Decisions — 1971*
The Federal Open Market Committee met thirteen
times during 1971 to review and evaluate developments
in the economy, and to prescribe what objectives open
market operations should 1ev to achieve until the next
FOMC meeting in order to further the longer-run goals
of monetary policy. The 1971 FOMC meetings are
grouped into three periods. The decisions of January
through April were conditioned by the shortfall of money
in the fourth quarter of 1970 and by an explicit desire
for lower long-term interest rates. The directives of the
May through August meetimmgs called for more moderate
growth of monetary aggregates, although aggregates grew
rapidly durimig most of the period. The directives of the
September through December meetings called for mod-
erate or somewhat greater growth in monetary-aggregates,
vet money was almost unchanged over the pem-iod.
January Through April: Desire For Moderately
Expansive Monetary Actions
The Comnnaittee desired that monetary-actions aceom-
mnodate time ecomiomnic recovery which was expected to
occur in the fm-st quarter. Early in this period, several
members of the Committee were concerned about the
~Data presented are those available to the Committee at the
particular meeting. Subsequent revisiomms niay have occurred
in some figures.
slower than desired growth in money in the fourth
quarter of 1970 amid also desired to see further declines
in long-term interest rates-Money market rates fell sub-
stantially durimig Jam,mrry and February.
Beginning in February, money began to grow very
rapidly amid several lomag-terni interest rates began to
rise. At the last three meetings of this period, the Com-
mittee called for accommodation of any decline in hong-
term rates. Proviso clauses were added to the directives
callimig for an adjustment of money market conditions
should the growth of aggregates deviate significantly
from the desired paths.
January 12 Meeting
The 1970 recessiomm \vas clearly in evidence at this
meeting. For example, real GNP was expected to show
a decline iii the fourth quarter of 1970, largely due to
the automobile immdustry strike. The unemployment rate
rose to 6 percent in December 1970, and the U. S. trade
balance was reported to have deteriorated further in
November. The fourtla quarter deficit in the balance of
paymemits on a liquidity basis was estimated to be about
the same as in the tlnrd quarter-, that is, about $3 billion.
Projectiomis by the staff of the Board of Governors
indicated a sharp recovery would begin in the first
quarter, primarily- as a result of a resumption of auto
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strength in the economy was expected to come from
residential construction and state and local spending.
Consumer expenditures were expected to increase only
moderately, apart from the anticipated return to a higher
rate of new car purchases early in the year, while
defense spending and fixed investment were not expected
to bolster economic activity over the first half of the
year.
Although money growth viewed over a longer time
period was about in line with the desired rate, a short-
fall had occurred in the fourth quarter of 1970. The
Committee had desired a 5 percent rate of money
growth, compared with an actual rate of 3.8 percent.
Analysis presented to the Committee at the January
meeting indicated more easing of money market condi-
tions would be necessary in order to expand Mm in the
first quarter at a 7.5 percent rate. The Committee de-
cided to seek “some moderate easing of money market
conditions.” Although a proviso clause was not directly
included in the directive, the “Record of Policy Actions”
indicates that members desired enomigh easing in money
market conditions to be able to make up for the slower
fourth quarter growth in money.
Mr. Francis dissented from this decision. He desired
a continuation of a 5 percent growth rate of money,
which was about the average rate in the second half of
1970. With this rate of growth of money he felt that
the “longer-run performance of production and prices
would be better than if money were to expand at some
faster rate.” In addition, he desired less emphasis on
money market conditions in implementing open market
operations.
February 9 Meeting
Some renewed evidence of upward pressure on prices
was given at this meeting. The consumer price index
rose considerably in December, and wholesale prices
rose rapidly in January, due in part to an increase in
agricultural prices.
Following the January meeting both long- and short-
term interest rates fell, which was thought to reflect the
reports of weak economic activity and market expecta-
tions of lower rates which had been buttressed by reduc-
tions in the prime lending rate and the discount rate. It
was noted at this meeting that money had increased less
in January than had been expected earlier. The Pohcy
Record stated that open market operations had been
aimed at somewhat easier money market conditions ini-
tially after the January meeting, and then sought more
easing as money fell short of Committee expectations.
Even with the slow January increase, growth of money
was expected to be at about a 6 percent annual rate in
the first quarter, assuming the prevailing money market
conditions were maintained. Although the Committee
agreed to “accommodate further declines in long-term
interest rates,” the February “Record of Policy Actions”
reported that mnembers of the Conimittee differed in
their views concerning objectives for money and short-
term credit markets and monetary and credit aggregates.
Some members continued to want more easing in money
market conditions, while other members wanted these
conditions unchanged in view of the recent and prospec-
tive rapid growth of monetary aggregates other than
mnoney and the ummdesirable conseqimences of lower short-
term rates for international capital flows. Also, some mem-
bers expressed a desire for less emphasis on short-nm
fluctuations in money in the period ahead.
The Committee directed open market operations to
“he conducted with a view to maintaining prevailing
production. The rate of increase of real GNP was ex-
pected to slow in subsequent quarters. Part of the
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money market conditions while accommodating addi-
tional downward movements in long-term rates.” In ad-
dition, the Committee added a proviso clause stating that
it desired to have money market conditions “promptly”
eased if growth of monetary aggregates fell below their
desired paths. “The Committee also agreed that its
objectives for interest rates would be facilitated if, to
the extent feasible, needs to supply reserves were met
by purchases of longer-term Treasury securities.”
Mr. Francis dissented from the February directive for
reasons similar to those at the previous meeting. Namely,
he preferred a5percent growth rate for money and
less emphasis on money market conditions in imple-
menting momietary policy.
March 9 Meeting
Yields on new issues of corporate and municipal bonds
began to rise in early February, although short-term
rates continued to fall. Several Committee members
expressed concern about the increases in long-term rates.
The desirability of renewed declines in long-term rates
was generally agreed upon, but it was also recognized
that “further sizable declines in short-term interest rates
would not serve a useful purpose.” Some members in-
dicated a desire to have some modest increase in short-
term rates in view of recent large capital outilows and
the expected rapid growth of monetary and credit
aggregates.
At the March meeting it was mioted that Mm, M
1
and
the adjusted credit proxy grew more rapidly in February
than had been expected at the previous meeting. Analy-
sis presented at the March meeting indicated Mm would
grow at about a 7 percent annual rate in the first quarter
of 1971 if prevailing money market conditions were
maintained, and that a more rapid rate could be ex-
pected in the second quarter.
Various views were expressed in regard to the empha-
sis that should be given monetary and credit aggregates
and on the appropriate rate of growth for these aggre-
gates. Some members were concerned about the pro-
jected rapid growth of aggregates in the second quarter.
Others “stressed the uncertainties attached to the projec-
tions ...and indicated that they were not disturbed by
the near-term outlook for the aggregates.”
The directive called for “maintaining prevailing money
market comiditions while accommodating any downward
movements in lommg-term rates.” A proviso clause was also
included stating that money market conditions should
be modified if it appeared the expected growth paths
were not achieved for monetary and credit aggregates.
April 6 Meeting
Real GNP was reported at this meeting to have risen
substantially in the first quarter; however, unemploy-
ment moved back up to 6 percent. Slower real GNP
growth was still expected in the second quarter, pri-
marily due to slower growth in sales of motor vehicles
and a decline in defense expenditures. The outlook for
the second half of 1971 was clouded by the possibility
of a steel strike, but assuming a strike of no more than
60 days, projections indicated the growth of real GNP
would be somewhat lugher than the anticipated growth
for the second quarter.
The U. S. foreign trade account showed only a small
surplus in January and February. The deficit in the
balance of payments -on the liquidity basis was expected
to be much larger in the first quarter than in the second
half of 1970, while on an official settlements basis the
first-quarter deficit in the payments balance was ex-
ceptionally large. These deficits were bolstered by heavy
capital flows of interest-sensitive funds.
Following the March meeting, short-term interest
rates began to rise, For example, 3-month Treasury bill
rates rose about 40 basis points. After rising considerably
in previous weeks, yields on new corporate and municipal
bonds fell after the March meeting, then later on began
to advance agaimi. Both Mi and M2 were reported to
have increased considerably more than had been ex-
pected at the previous meeting, while the adjusted credit
proxy grew less rapidly than was expected. It was
estimated that Ma grew at about an 8 percent annual
rate in the first quarter, M2 at a 17.5 percent rate, and
the adjusted credit proxy at an 11 percent rate. In
response to the “considerably faster than expected”
growth of Mm and Ma, some “slight finning of money
mnarket conditions was sought after the March meeting.
Under the assumption of maintaining prevailing money
market conditions, analysis indicated Mm would grow
even faster in the second quarter than the 8 percent in
the previous quarter. Growth of various time deposits,
however, was expected to slow substantially, leading to
moderation in the growth of M2 and the credit proxy.
The Committee agreed that open market operations
should be aimned at “attaining temporarily some minor
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firming in money market conditions.” Some members
wanted this firming in order to narrow the difference
between short-term interest rates here and abroad so
as to moderate capital outflows, The Committee stated
its desire to have “more moderate expansion in the mon-
etary aggregates in the second quarter than had occurred
in the first,” that is, less than 8 percent.
Two members dissented from this directive, favoring
in both cases “more firming of money market condi-
tions” than implied in the Coanmittee’s directive. Mr.
Hayes thought there was a “need for moving toward
somewhat higher short-term interest rates in light of the
international financial situation” as well as the “risk of
excessive growth in the money stock.” Mr. Kimbrel
thought “higher short-tenn interest rates would be de-
sirable mainly to hold growth in the monetary and
credit aggregates to a moderate pace in order to avoid
a rekindling of inflationary expectations.”
The “Record of Policy Actions” for the May 11 meet-
ing states that initially after the April meeting ‘some-
what firmer conditions in the money market”were sought.
Then as aggregates, primarily Ma, grew faster than ex-
pected, “some slight additioamal fimining was sought.” The
Federal funds rate advanced from about around 3% per-
cent following the March meeting to about 4¼percent
in the first part of April and remained there until the
end of April. “Subsequently, however, despite large-
scale, reserve-supplying operations by the System, the
Federal funds rate advanced to a range around 4½
per cent.”
May Through August: Moderating the
Growth of Monetary Aggregates and the
Rise of Long-Term Interest Rates
Evidence of economic recovery was presented during
the meetings of this period, with retail sales and housing
starts among the strongest indicators. Unemployment,
however, remained around the 6 percent level, and
there was little evidence of an abatement of inflationary
pressures.
The directives of each meeting during this period
called for “moderate” or “more moderate” growth in
monetary aggregates. However, except for August, the
Committee modified this objective in each directive by
stating that “developments in capital markets” should be
taken into account. This modifying clause might be inter-
preted as meaning to minimize upward pressures on
long-term rates as finner money market conditions were
sought in order to moderate growth of aggregates.
May 11 Meeting
Preliminary Commerce Department figures indicated
that real GNP had increased at a 6.5 percent annual rate
in the first quarter, after declining at a 3.9 percent rate
in the fourth quarter of 1970. More moderate growth in
real GNP was expected in the second quarter.
The deficits in the balance of payments were de-
scribed as “extremely large” for the first quarter. These
deficits were attributed to short-term capital outflows
resulting frona the differential between interest rates
here amid abroad as well as speculation concerning
changes in exchange rates. Heaxy flows of dollars into
European currencies, such as the German mark, were
reported in the first few days of April, but had subsided
during the next three weeks. In early May several
countries, includimag Germany, Switzerland, the Nether-
lands, Belgium, and Austria, suspended sales of their
currencies for dollars; the Germama mark and Dutch
guilder were floated; and the Swiss franc and Austrian
schilling were revalued upsvard.
Short- and long-term interest rates rose sharply fol-
lowing tlae April meeting. Growth of the money stock
was revised upward for March, bringing Mm to a 9 per-
cent annual rate in the first quarter. Assuming money
market conditions similar to those prevailing during most
of April, amialysis indicated Ma would increase at about
a 9 percent annual rate in the second quartea-. Even
with somewhat firmer mnoney market conditions, Mr
was expected to grow at about an 8.5 percent rate in
the second quarter.
Members of the Committee expressed concern about
both rapid growth in monetary aggregates as well as
Page 28FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS MARCH 1972
the marked increases in long-term interest rates. Because
of these concerns, the Committee decided neither to
revert to the money naarket conditiomis which prevailed
in April, nor to seek--a slaarp flaming in money market
conditions considered necessary to attain a sharp reduc-
tion in the grosvtla of aggregates ima the secomad quarter.
Iaaitiallv, the Desk was imastructed to mnaimitaimm prevailing
mnoaiev mnarket conditiomis imi view of even-keel consid-
erations. Thereafter, if significant deviatiomis froan the
expected paths for the aggregates occurred, money mar-
ket conditions were to he finned, but in a cam,tior,,s
manner “witla a view to avoiding undue reactions in
capital markets.” Becam.mse of uaacertaimaties prevailing imi
donaestic fimaancial amad foreigmi exchamige markets, the
Accouaat M;anager was giveaa more thami aasamal discretion
in carryiaag om mt opema mnarket trammsactions.
June 8 and 29 Meetings
Short-terna imiterest rates contimiued to increase during
May- amid Jimmie, a tm-eaid begumi in March. Yields on new
issue corporate homads \vere, oma average, about the same
in late Jimmie as ima earlr- May, while yields on mammiicipal
boaids ‘vere somewhat Imiglmer.
At the earlr- Jimmie mneetimmg, it ‘a’as reported that the
maaomiev stock, as well as other aggregates, imicreased in
Ma~ at substantially rmiom-e rapid m-ates thama had been
expected at time Ma mneeting. At the late Jamne naeet-
imig, prd imia in am clata immd ica e al nitmmmcv was gi-oiving
rapidly in Jmmmie, hut less rapid than in Ma. Thims in
view of this rapid growth, opemi naarkct operations were
dim-ected towamrds somewhat firmner conditions.” TIme
F’ecleral fumids rate advaaaced fm-om ahout 4½percent at
the timnc of the May mneetimig to abom mt 5½percemit at the
timne of the laitc Jumae mneetimag.
At the early Jmmmae mneeting projectiomis indicated that
money wmmld imacrease at ahommt a 12 percemit annual rate
in the secomid quarter, amid arcmund 10 or 11 percent in
the third quarter, assuanimmg amnchanged money market
comaditions. With somewhat firmer conditions, little change
was expected in the second quarter growth rate of
naoney, and a reduction of only about one percent was
expected in the third quarter projections. Projections
for the growth of money at the late June aneeting were
similar to those of the early June meeting.
At both of these meetimigs, members continued to
express conceraa about the rapid growth of aggregates
and the rise in interest rates. With regard to monetary
aggregates, at the early June meeting the Committee
stated its desire to seek “somewhat slower growth over
conming months than appeared likely to eventraate if pre-
vailing money market conditions were maintained.” The
directive of the late Jumae mimeeting also called for more
moderate growth imi monetary aggregates. With regard
to interest rates the Commmmittee stated at both meetings
that a sharp firmning of money- market conditions should
be avoided, smm as to rmumiimnize upward pressures on
lomig- termii imiterest rates.
July.27 Meeting
Prelimniaaary Commerce Department estimates indi-
cated that real GNP imacreased in the second quarter at
about half the rate of the first quarter. Projections by the
staff indicated that real CNP would slow somewhat in
the tlurd quarter, hut would accelerate in the fourth
quairter. Wholesale iaidustrial and comasunaer prices in—
cm-eased “substantially” imi Jumae. It ~vas noted that these
price rocasures Imadl risen at a faster rate in the second
qamarter than earlier in 1971.
The U.S. balance-of-pavnaents deficit for the second
qm.marter was described as “extraordiraarily large.” This
deficit reflected partly the capital outflows, which re-
sulted more frommm expectations of a further realignment
of currencies amid less from intem-est dillerentials than in
the first quartem-, amid paartlv a deficit in the tm’ade balance
comaiparcd with a surphms imi the previous quarter. Re—
macwed tensiomas imm fmmmeigma exchange niarkets were also
mioted imm July.
Sliort-tcm-rmm imiterest rates gcncrally- rmmse after the June
29 mneeting, while lomig-tenu rates chamigecl little on hal-
amice after rising in the second quarter. The mnoney stock
rmmseat aai 115 liercemit rate imi the sec-mind quarter, com-
pared with a 9 percemit rate imi the first qm.marter. Growth
of other mrmonetarv -aggregates (M. amid the baamik credit
proxy) uvere mmoted tmm have decelerated in the second
quarter.
Amialysis presemmted at the Jm.mlr- meeting indicated
momie wommid expand amt -abmmmmt a9pcrcemit annual rate
fri the third quarter amid at a mnamch shower rate in the
fourth qmmarter Time Comnniittee agreed more moderate
growth of aggm’egates remmmained the appropriate objec-
tive. Howea-em-, eu-en-keel commsiderations were noted as
a comastraimmt mmmi opema mnarket operations until the next
nmeeting. Also, as in several previous meetings, develop-
mneaats imm capital markets “-crc to lie taken into account.
With these shimmrt—tcm-mmm objectives, the Account Manager
uvas-amgain giu-emi muon’ tha;aaa usm al discretion in conducting
opemi inarket m mpcratim mm Is-
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August 24 Meeting
The President’s New Economic Program was an-
nounced on August 15, heading to a tentative reappraisal
of the economic outlook by the staff. Expectations of a
faster growth in real GNP in the rest of 1971 were
enhanced when the President announced the new pro-
gram. The rate of advance of prices was expected to
slow, thus reducing somewhat the current-dollar GNP
for the remainder of the year. The balance-of-payments
deficit was noted to be increasing sharply after mid-year,
and was described as “massive” in the first half of August.
Analysis .presented at this meeting indicated money
growth “would moderate somewhat in August and Sep-
tember and would slow substantially further in the fourth
quarter,” assuming prevailing money market conditions
were maintained. It noted that because of the new pro-
gram, projections for growth of aggregates were subject
to sizable errors. The Committee decided in view of the
difficulties in assessing the impact of the New Economic
Prograni on economic activity, that a “marked change
in the stance of policy would be premature.” However,
the Committee agreed to seek growth in aggregates
“well below” the rates of previous months,
September-December: Cautious Move
Toward Restoring Money Growth
In the remainder of 1971 there was a reversal of
trends for interest rates and monetary aggregates. Inter-
est rates fell considerably from mid-August 1971 to mid-
January 1972, while the money stock exhibited almost
no growth. During this period the Committee desired
to have moderate growth in monetary aggregates, but
also desired that the easing of money market conditions
necessary to achieve this growth be made in a cautious
manner. Later in this period, as the substantial reversal in
the growth of the aggregates became more apparent, some-
what more emphasis was placed on achieving renewed
moderate growth in aggregates.
September 21 and October 19 Meetings
At the September meeting the outlook for real GNP
was for a “significantly slower” rate of increase in the
third quarter than the estimated 4.8 percent rate in the
second quarter. Projections for the fourth quarter in-
dicated growth of real GNP would accelerate and price
increases would moderate, partly in response to the New
Economic Program.
Staff projections reported at the October meeting were
optimistic for the first half of 1972. Real GNP was ex-
pected to grow at, or slightly below, the expected fourth
quarter rate. This projection was based on an expected
growth of consumer spending and business capital out-
lays. Projections of real GNP for both the fourth quarter
of 1971 and the first half of 1972 were “appreciably
faster” than those before the announcement of the New
Economic Program.
Short- and long-term interest rates fell immediately
following the President’s announcement. The downward
trend in interest rates, in general, continued through
the October 19 meeting. At these meetings it was noted
that both Ma and M2 had grown at slower rates in
August and September than had been anticipated.
Analysis presented at the September meeting indi-
cated that Ma and Ma would grow in the third quarter
at rates well below those of the second quarter. If pre-
vailimag money naarket conditions were maintained,
money growth was expected to “show further in the
fourth quarter.” At the October meeting, analysis sug-
gested that money would increase in the fourth quarter
at about the same rate as the third, and that money
growth was likely to accelerate in the first quarter of
1972.
Directives issued at these two meetings called for
“moderate growth in monetary and credit aggregates.”
The September meeting also contained a modifying
clause specifying that developnaents in the capital market
should be taken into account. Although the Committee
recognized the need for easing money market con-
ditions in order to achieve this moderate growth of
aggregates, the Committee at both meetings wanted to
avoid an “aggressive” or a “marked” easing in order to
achieve moderate growth of money imm the near-term.
One reason given for avoiding an aggressive easing
of money market conditions was “to minimize the risk
of rekindling inflationary expectations.” A second reason
given was that in view of the rapid growth of money
in the first seven months of the year, “a marked easing
designed to stimulate faster growth in the near term
would not be warranted,” A gradual easing of money
market conditions was umadertaken by the Desk following
the September and October meetings.
November 16 Meeting
Price indexes showed a marked improvement for
September and October, reflecting the price-wage freeze.
Staff projections of real GNP growth for the fourth
quarter dmf 1971 and the first half of 1972 were reduced
slightly from time projections presented at the previous
meeting. Following time October meeting, market interest
rates comitimaumecl to decline,
Money declined slightly in Septenaber and October.
Growth of M1 was anticipated to resume in December
amid accelerate imi the first quarter of 1972, assuming
naoney market comiditions were maintained similar to or
somewhat easier than those prevailing. It was expected
that Ma would grow sdmmewhat faster in the fourth
quarter than the 4.5 percent rate in the third quarter.
Tbme uncertainty surrounding the transition from Phase
It o Phase 11 of the President’s New Econonaic Program
and time imiternational situation was recognized by the
Commnittee as adversely affecting consumer confidence,
Some members felt that persistence of weak performance
in the monetary aggregates might add to this uncertainty.
Some members continued, however, to warn against “un-
dumly aggressive action to stimulate monetary expansion.”
The Committee directed that “somewhat greater
growth” of monetary aggregates should be attained over
the months ahead. The Committee recognized that “ap-
preciably easier money market conditions” might be
necessary in order to achiieu’e this growth.
Page 30FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS MARCH 1972
December 14 Meeting
Commerce Department esthnates of real GNP growth
were revised upward to 4 percent for the third quarter.
Growth of real GNP appeared to be somewhat faster in
the fourth quarter as well. The rates of increase in prices
and wages were sharply lower during the “freeze” period.
Money changed little in November and, on balance,
no growth in money occurred from August to November.
Some short- amid iong-tem-m interest rates rose slighily
following the November meeting, but most rates began
to decline again before the Deceniber meeting. Follow-
ing the November meeting, the Federal funds rate fell
from about 4¾percent to about 4% percent at the time
of the Decemnber meeting.
Analysis indicated that easing of money market con-
ditions would likely be required to achieve moderate
growth of Ma in December and January. The weakness
of M1 and total member bank reserves over the pre-
vious four months was of “considerable concern” to
some of the Committee, Some members urged “more
aggressive actions” be taken, while others desired a
“more cautious and gradual” approach. The Committee
agreed, however,
-- -to promote the degree of ease in bank reserve
and money market conditions essential to greater
growth in monetary aggregates over the months
ahead.
This article is avaliable as Reprint No, 76
Page 31